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Abstract
Discussing modes of political and/or economic decoupling in an era of economic 
globalization seems almost contradictory as the dominating keywords in the lat-
ter are increasing integration, interdependency and harmonization. For example, 
when looking towards the political realm it seems problematic to suggest that a 
nation-state can opt for a withdrawal from the global community in order to nur-
ture its domestic potential. Likewise, when looking towards the economic realm, 
it seems even more problematic to suggest the possibility of a national economy 
withdrawing from the global economy, taking an increasing internationalization 
of domestic markets into account. Nonetheless, there is a discourse devoted to 
just that, namely whether or not to decouple economically and politically from 
the global community. The present article explores this discourse by ﬁrst taking 
a critical look at the concept of decoupling. It then proceeds by presenting a dif-
ferent approach towards the study of the relationship between the global and 
national level by introducing the notion of triangulation. It is argued that the 
relationship between economic globalization, national economics and a given 
societal context in which the two former are embedded, is governed by various 
layers of interdependency. This means that one cannot solely focus on one point 
in the triangle and thus decouple, so to speak, the other two in order to under-
stand, for example, the political or economic forces at play there. According to the 
argument forwarded in this article, one has to take all three points in the triangle 
into account in order to disentangle and thus understand the complex web of 
interdependency among the three. To illustrate the workings of this approach, a 
case study of the ramiﬁcations of a newly initiated national economic develop-
ment plan in Malaysia is introduced. The article ends by returning to the decou-
pling discourse to re-examine it in the light of the ﬁndings from the case study.1
Keywords: decoupling, triangulation, economic development, inter-ethnic relations, 
industrialization, nation building, Penang, Malaysia
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Introduction
When discussing the current global ﬁnancial crisis, one of the striking 
features, besides the negative ramiﬁcation for the global as well as for 
the individual national economy, is the externalization of the strong 
linkages between the different international ﬁnancial markets as well 
as the individual national economy's lack of ability to shield its domes-
tic market from the negative effects from the international crisis. This 
points towards a world community that does not consist of independ-
ent nation-states in a realist sense, but rather of nation-states that are 
bound together in a political and economic community characterized 
by interdependency and an ever-increasing process of political and 
economic integration. Despite these seemingly obvious facts, there is 
nonetheless a lively discourse on whether a national economy, or aspects 
of a national economy, can decouple, either completely or momentarily, 
from this global-cum-local state of interdependency. Interestingly, this 
discourse has been (re)fuelled by the current major difference between 
Western and Asian markets. As it is now (August 2011), the former are 
on the edge of moving into recession, whereas the latter are experienc-
ing growth rates at around 5 to 7 per cent, not to mention China and 
India, with their current growth rates almost hitting double-digit ﬁgures, 
according to the Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011.2 Does this 
difference between Western and Asian markets allow the latter to at 
least momentarily decouple from their troubled Western counterparts 
in order to nurture their developmental potential?
The present article explores the viability of this discourse by ﬁrst taking 
a critical look at the discourse of decoupling. It then proceeds by present-
ing an alternative approach to studying the relationship between the glo-
bal and national by introducing the concept of triangulation. It is argued 
that the relationship between economic globalization, national economics 
and a given societal context in which the ﬁrst two are embedded, is gov-
erned by various layers of interdependency. This means that one cannot 
solely focus on one point in the triangle, thus decoupling, so to speak, 
the two other in order to understand, for example, the political forces at 
play there. One has to take all three points in the triangle into account to 
disentangle and thus understand the complex web of interdependencies 
among them. To illustrate the workings of this approach, a case study 
based on the newly initiated national development plan in Malaysia is 
introduced. The article ends by returning to the decoupling discourse to 
re-examine it in the light of the ﬁndings from the case study.
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On the Notion of Decoupling: Real Possibility or an 
Intellectual Exercise?
The intellectual roots behind the notion of decoupling can be found 
in the Dependency School, which dominated mainstream political 
and economic discourses during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s with its 
focus on the world as divided into a so-called First World versus a 
Third World political and economic power structure. The theoretical 
foundation behind this bifocal view of the world was mainly based on 
neo-Marxist approaches formulated by scholars such as Frank (1978), 
Banaji (1977), Amin (1974), Emmanuel (1972) and Wallerstein (1979). 
The point of departure of this school of thought was the political and 
economic processes that had their origin in a colonial and imperialist 
past, which then manifested themselves in a global centre-periphery 
relationship in which the centre monopolized and controlled processes 
of capital accumulation that were fuelled by resource extraction in the 
periphery.3 These approaches were applied mainly to Latin America 
and Africa. The link to the discourse on decoupling was provided by 
Frank, who maintained that Third World countries should de-link from 
the First World in order to develop, as such linkages were harmful for 
the periphery. With fewer linkages to the centre, Third World countries 
could concentrate on domestic development and import substitution, 
all guided by a developmental state based on a revolutionary socialist 
ideology (Frank 1978).
This theoretical macro perspective was later replaced by theories of 
globalization in which multinational companies were the main players 
and nation-states acted as economic facilitators for domestic industrial 
internationalization processes, developments that in particular have 
been discussed within international business theory by Porter (1990), 
Dunning and Lundan (2009), Shenkar (2004) and Rugman and Verbeke 
(2004), just to mention a few scholars in this rich ﬁeld of research. Up 
until 2008 observers found supportive evidence for budding notions 
of decoupling especially in Asian emerging markets. A good case in 
point is the discourse on 'Asian values' during the 1970s, 1980s and 
early 1990s (see for example, Jacobsen and Bruun 2000), and again after 
the Asian ﬁnancial crisis in 1997 that showed tremendous economic 
growth rates especially in China and India and much higher growth 
rates in the rest of East and Southeast Asia compared to the Western 
economies. As such, Asian economies were perceived to be resistant 
to the contractions in the American and European economies due 
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to their strong and constantly growing domestic markets, high cur-
rency reserves and prudent macroeconomic policies, partly based on 
experiences learnt during the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis and partly based on 
perceived speciﬁc modes of doing business compared to their Western 
counterparts.4
During 2008 and 2009, however, cracks in the notion of decoupling 
began to emerge. The meltdown on Wall Street in 2008 sent shockwaves 
through the entire global ﬁnancial system, not least in the Asian mar-
kets. Contrary to what those who believed in decoupling expected, the 
losses were even greater outside the US, with the worst experienced 
in emerging markets and developed economies such as Germany and 
Japan.5 Even though China was relatively hard hit by the global eco-
nomic contraction that followed the ﬁnancial meltdown, it managed to 
engineer a decent rebound (together with India and a group of larger 
emerging economies in Asia), whereas the US, Europe and Japan still 
remain more or less on the verge of recession.
In the ﬁrst half of 2011 it seemed as if the global economy was ap-
proaching the second bottom of a seemingly 'W–shaped' (also called 
'double dip') economic crisis. Taking into account the many ﬁscal 
stimulus packages introduced by states in 2009 and 2010 to stabilize 
national economies around the globe, it seems at least for the time being 
that the Asia packages have had the greatest impact on the individual 
economies, thus rejuvenating an otherwise rather battered discourse on 
regional or national modes of decoupling. However, the main question 
remains whether the current growth of the Asian economies is a sign of 
a budding decoupling from the global economy, and in particular from 
the Western economies. It is still too early to state this as a fact, as we 
do not know whether the current recovery will be sustained once the 
effects of the massive stimulus packages begin to fade.
Taking a critical approach towards analyzing these developments 
from a decoupling perspective is the relationship between decoupling 
and the underlying process of internationalization of individual national 
economies. Even though a given national economy has been stimulated 
and facilitated in its development by the state, this is not to say that the 
economy is also becoming detached from the global economy. The link-
ages between a national economy and the global economy are still very 
much in place, as can be seen when looking at the national economy's 
dependence on foreign direct investments (FDI) for its continued growth, 
and through its membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
thus gradually aligning its modes of developing its own economy with 
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the global one.6 Turning towards political decoupling, this has been tried 
by ASEAN through its developmental regionalism experiment initiated 
in 1998. That experience was closed down in 2001 due to heavy criti-
cism by the major global economic players as an attempt to introduce 
differentiated levels of competitiveness between the national, regional 
and global levels, thus damaging the free ﬂow of capital between them 
(Nesadureai 2004).
Thus, it is rather problematic to employ the notion of decoupling, as 
global and local linkages are rather strong and pervasive. It seems as 
if the discourse on decoupling is not aware of the current gradual dis-
mantling of the historically conditioned Western economic hegemony, 
a condition that is being replaced by a more ﬂuid, interdependent and 
contextualized economic world order that is based on shifting centres of 
capital accumulation. Asia is a very good case in point (and China and 
India in particular), taking the current developments in this region into 
consideration. Decoupling or recoupling, if we are to use these terms 
at all, seem to be not so much economic in nature, but rather constitute 
a part of a politically inspired discourse in which the notions of de- or 
re-coupling constitute a potent political signiﬁer. Taking this stand on 
decoupling reduces it to a domestic policy manifestation that reﬂects 
a given position in an international landscape of multiple and shifting 
power centres, thereby unintentionally accepting an increasing global 
interdependency between and harmonization of individual national 
economies as discussed especially by Rugman and Verbeke (2004).
Introducing a Different Approach to Notions of 
Decoupling
Before introducing a different approach to analyzing the relationship 
between economic globalization and national economies, it is important 
to take a closer look at the current global political and economic landscape 
to identify the various opportunities and constraints that are impacting 
the different economies in the Asian region. Based on a geo-economic 
understanding of the global economy, Thomas L. Friedman, in his book, 
The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (2005), put 
forward the notion that the world is ﬂat as a metaphor for viewing the 
world economy as an increasingly level playing ﬁeld. This means that 
everybody in the global marketplace has an equal opportunity in terms 
of doing business. Due to what Friedman calls 'the ten ﬂatteners',7 which 
all have led towards global interdependency, the so-called steroids,8 
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combined with the triple global convergence,9 as well as modes of doing 
business in the global marketplace, have gradually become more aligned, 
especially in the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century.
These global developments have had a strong impact on regional and 
local differences, integrating them and thus hybridizing them to such an 
extent that the regional and the local cannot be distinguished as sepa-
rate entities but only as integrated parts of the overall global economic 
whole. The ultimate consequence of what can thus be called 'a glocalized 
marketplace' is the development of an ever-increasing market fragmen-
tation with implications for both global and local levels of competition, 
network practices and forms of company ownership. Due to time-space 
compression, as discussed by Harvey (1989), inter- and intra-ﬁrm com-
munication is thus instantaneous, making adaptation to local market 
and institutional conditions an option and not a necessity!
The Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz has been rather 
critical of Friedman's notion of a ﬂat world. In his book Making Globali-
zation Work, he writes:
Friedman is right that there have been dramatic changes in the global 
economy, in the global landscape; in some directions, the world is much 
ﬂatter than it has ever been, with those in various parts of the world being 
more connected than they have ever been, but the world is not ﬂat […] Not 
only is the world not ﬂat: in many ways it has been getting less ﬂat (Stiglitz 
2006: 7).
In another reaction to the notion of a ﬂat world, Richard Florida 
(2005) from George Mason University argued that the world is not ﬂat 
but 'spiky'. According to Florida, the world can be divided into three 
separate major categories that together make up the modern economic 
landscape: cities that generate innovations, economic 'hills', and the 
'valleys' in between the two former. To illustrate this, he and some col-
leagues developed a map that shows geo-economically what a 'spiky 
world' would look like. The map illustrates economic activity estimated 
on the basis of light emission. Many cities, despite their large popula-
tions, barely register due to low levels of economic activity.
The cities that are capable of generating technological innovations 
constitute the tallest peaks on this map and are difﬁcult to topple. 
They attract global talent and create new products and industries. The 
so-called 'economic hills' are places that manufacture the world's es-
tablished goods and support innovation engines. The hills can rise and 
fall quickly; they are prosperous but insecure in terms of investment. 
Finally, there are the 'valleys' in between the other two categories. These 
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are places or areas with little connection to the global economy and thus 
few immediate prospects for economic development. 
According to this geo-economic perspective, the world is deﬁnitely not 
ﬂat but constitutes a highly differentiated but interdependent landscape, 
if we are to believe these categorizations. In order to further substantiate 
the notion of a spiky world there are, however, more advanced ways 
of showing that a differentiated, interdependent and indeed 'spiky' 
economic landscape is rather close to reality. One of these ways can be 
found in international business theory (Peng and Meyer 2011; Peng 2009; 
Ahlstrom and Bruton 2010). Besides showing that the various national 
economies are indeed interrelated and interdependent, theoretical ap-
proaches from this school of thought delineate various types of markets 
that are a direct reﬂection of the current forces that deﬁne the structure 
of the global economy.
What Makes a Landscape 'Spiky' and not Flat?
To answer this question one has to divide the global market into three 
main types: developed markets, transitional and/or emerging markets 
and bottom of the pyramid (BOP) markets. The so-called developed 
markets are those that contain the highest 'spikes'. These types of 
markets can generally be found in what can be termed high-trust soci-
eties. This refers to societies in which a high level of trust is placed in 
governmental institutions that provide for accountability, checks and 
balances, judicial protection, and punishment of ofﬁcial corruption. In 
other words, these markets are deﬁned by rules and regulations and 
as such attract a vast number of international and domestic investors.10 
Furthermore, the societies in which these markets can be found can be 
characterized as exhibiting moderate growth rates and having stable 
political regimes.
The role of the state in developed markets can be organized into two 
main ideal types: liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated 
market economies (CMEs).11 In short, the role of the state in the LMEs can 
be characterized as minimal. This means that the state plays a minor role 
in regulating the market and ideally leaves the market to its own regu-
latory mechanisms with only minor interventions in order to stimulate 
the economy. In this category one would place, for example, the US and 
UK markets. This perception of the US and UK markets has temporarily 
changed due to the impact of the current ﬁnancial crisis. The state has 
to a great extent increased its intervention into those two markets so as 
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to facilitate an otherwise faltering economy. There are, however, heavy 
political costs associated with this new practice. This can be seen espe-
cially in the US, where Republican politicians are heavily attacking the 
Obama administration for being almost socialist in its approach towards 
the current crisis thus more or less leading to a stalemate within the po-
litical establishment. The role of the state in a CME can be categorized 
as Keynesian. Here the state plays a major role as an economic facilitator 
and regulator, a role that expands and contracts according to ﬂuctuations 
in the market. This kind of market can be found mainly in Germany and 
Scandinavia. Both of these two major ideal types of economic markets 
are within the developed market category.12
Turning towards transitional and/or emerging markets, this is where 
one ﬁnds the 'hills'. They can generally be characterized as going through 
a period of transition from a planned economy towards an open market 
economy (as, for example, Russia, China and Vietnam are currently do-
ing), and based on more or less functioning formal rules and regulations 
due to the impact from localized mindsets and traditional value systems. 
Other characteristics are high growth rates, very competitive low-cost 
manufacturing, high-risk economies and unstable political regimes. In 
general, the kind of societies one ﬁnds in these kinds of markets can be 
deﬁned as low-trust societies. This means that individuals do not trust 
ofﬁcial institutions due to corruption and non-transparent political and 
bureaucratic practices leading to inefﬁcient implementation of the rules 
and regulations emanating from the formal institutions. Instead they 
turn to informal networks based on family relations and non-kin-centred 
network practices built on relational trust between, for example, business 
partners.13 In other words, informal institutions have a rather greater 
impact on the functionality of the formal institutions, thus creating what 
Peng and Zhou (2005) have termed 'institutional voids'.
In terms of market characteristics, a transitional and/or emerging 
market can be positioned somewhere between an LME and a CME. 
This means that the role and involvement of the state in the economy is 
relatively high. There is a host of literature on the state in these kinds of 
markets referring to the state as being either an interventionist state or 
a developmental state that to a great extent is involved in the economy 
and thus also in the overall national industrial development (see for 
example Hutchinson 2009 and Beh 2007). Although variations of the 
developmental type of state can also be found in developed markets, it 
is mainly related to transitional and/or emerging markets, where mar-
ket structures are relatively weak and unregulated and thus easy prey 
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for global competition. These kinds of markets can be found in former 
Eastern Europe and Russia, Latin America, Africa, India and most of 
Asia except Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore.
The ﬁnal category of markets I will touch upon in this context is the 
so-called 'bottom of the pyramid' also called 'BOP' markets. They con-
stitute the 'valleys' according to Richard Florida's typology. They can 
be characterized by an absence of formal institutions, that is, of very 
few or no formal rules and regulations at all. Here informal rules can be 
understood as mainly socially sanctioned norms of behaviour that are 
embedded in cultural and religious practices as well as in local value 
systems. BOP markets are characterized by people who live in rural areas 
and urban slums and shanty towns. They have few assets, have little or 
no education, are outside conventional distribution, credit and commu-
nication networks, and they subsist on less than US$4 a day (Peng 2009: 
6) These types of markets are scattered throughout the world, mostly in 
countries outside the West, for example, in parts of Latin America, Africa, 
India, China and Southeast Asia. One of the interesting things about BOP 
markets is that they have the potential to develop into emerging markets 
should the government invest in infrastructure thus preparing the ground 
for companies other than multinational corporations (MNCs) to tap into 
these markets. The main companies behind this kind of development 
are often successful pioneers who ﬁrst established themselves in these 
difﬁcult markets. One such pioneer is Unilever Hindustan, which oper-
ates rather successfully in an Indian BOP market.14
Background and Main Features of an Emerging Market: 
The Case of Asia
There are several features that act as drivers in the Asian markets. 
Perhaps one of the most important ones is a liberalization of markets, 
which includes deregulation and privatization as well as a reduction of 
trade and investment barriers. Many of these initiatives are prompted in 
part by economic globalization and in part by state-initiated economic 
development schemes in which incoming FDI constitutes an important 
prerequisite. Interestingly, most East and Southeast Asian countries did 
not subscribe to import substitution programmes in the 1960s and 1970s 
as most of the Latin American countries did. This had something to do 
with the geopolitical positions of the two regions vis-à-vis the US. For 
example, the industrialization of South Korea and the other so-called 
'Asian tigers' was in line with the US's geopolitical strategy of build-
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ing a 'contention belt' of capitalist countries around China and other 
communist states in Asia, which involved granting incentives for these 
countries to export to the US. In contrast, Latin American countries were 
outside the main areas of US geopolitical concerns in this connection, 
as the US saw them as constituting its own backyard.
In short, what is an import substitution policy? Originally it was a stra-
tegically designed national politically initiated trade and economic pro-
gramme that was directed toward the domestic market. It was especially 
prevalent in the 1970s as part of the developmental schemes of several 
states, especially in Latin America. It generally worked by having the state 
nationalize and/or subsidize key industries as well as develop high entry 
barriers for foreign capital in the form of, for example, tax schemes so as 
to protect domestic industries against international competition. One of 
the positive things that can be mentioned in this context is that it created 
employment, thus strengthening the political legitimacy of the state. In 
this sense it was thus more of a policy scheme than an economic develop-
ment plan. Eventually import substitution programmes were abolished, as 
the domestic markets were generally too small to maintain or even build 
up a sustainably high level of GDP. Basically, there were too few people 
buying locally produced products in the domestic market. Finally, and 
perhaps more importantly, the policy failed because countries could not 
de-link themselves from other countries, as they depended too much on 
foreign capital,  especially foreign direct investments, as well as access to 
international markets for their products in order to increase local capital 
accumulation (Krugman and Obstfeld 2009).
Instead, an aggressive market liberalization took place, especially after 
the Asian ﬁnancial crisis in 1997. This resulted in increased jockeying 
for FDI among the different countries, thus furthering the differences 
between the countries in the region due to their growing individual 
industrial capabilities. This occurred despite the fact that they were 
becoming increasingly more interdependent due to the construction of 
several regional organizations such as ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, AFTA, 
etc. These increasingly more complex developments have resulted in 
an asymmetrical ranking between the different Asian economies, as 
the development path of the individual country is strongly dependent 
on its speciﬁc resources, institutions, economic structure and political 
ideologies, not forgetting the speciﬁcity of the individual local, social 
and cultural fabric (Evans 2005; Campbell 2005). This increasing com-
plexity and interdependency among the countries within ASEAN as 
well as among the East Asian countries raises a critique of the notion 
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of 'best practice' in, for example, international business theory. Based 
on the above, the main question is whether it is at all possible to talk 
about a 'best practice' in an emerging market, taking all its complexities 
and volatility into account. The same goes for whether it is possible for 
individual nation-states to decouple from these developments. Just as 
in the case of the notion of best practice, the answer has to be 'no', based 
on the above discussion of the interdependent and yet different types 
of markets found in the Asian region.
Zooming Further in on the Asian Markets:  
The Case of Malaysia
As discussed above, the Asian markets and their relations to the global 
economy do indeed constitute a landscape from which it is very difﬁcult 
to decouple. Furthermore, it is a dynamic economic and political land-
scape that consists of a few 'spikes' such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Singapore, just to mention the most prominent, several 
'hills', including Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Viet-
nam, and some 'valleys': Cambodia, Laos and Burma. Interestingly, the 
states in the last group are rather stable in terms of their categorization, 
but the 'hills' are vigorously jockeying to become the highest 'hill' in the 
region in terms of economic performance, thus making the markets in 
this part of the world quite volatile. In this section we shall zoom in on 
Malaysia, a country that has for some time been termed one of the most 
politically stable and economically dynamic 'hills' in Southeast Asia, in 
order to assess its potential for decoupling in case it ﬁnds a need for 
doing so, politically, economically or otherwise.
The Malaysian market economy can be classiﬁed as being in the up-
per end of the Southeast Asian emerging markets. According to the 
Economist Intelligence Unit's May 2011 report on Malaysia,15 it forecasts 
Malaysia's political stability during the period 2011-2015 to come under 
moderate threat, not because of any major shift in the balance of power, 
but rather owing to internal strife within the two main political alliances. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit expects the governing Barisan Nasional 
(BN) coalition to call an early election, most likely in 2012, a year before 
its current term ends. Fiscal policy will be tightened gradually during 
the forecast period, as the government strives to balance its budget by 
2020. Monetary policy will also become tighter as domestic demand 
strengthens. The economy is expected to resume a fairly stable growth 
path during the period following a mild recession in 2009 and a strong 
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rebound in 2010. Real GDP growth will average 5.4 per cent per year in 
the forecast period. The rate of inﬂation will accelerate to 3.2 per cent in 
2011 and will then average 3.6 per cent a year in 2012-2015. The govern-
ment plans to rationalize the country's extensive subsidy schemes, and 
this will push up consumer prices. Despite the faster pace of growth in 
merchandise imports than in exports, Malaysia will continue to post 
substantial trade and current-account surpluses in the forecast period.
Malaysia — A Declining 'Hill'?
Taking these macroeconomic and policy predictions at face value, 
Malaysia can apparently be deﬁned as a fairly stable and sound 'hill'. 
This goes in particular for Penang, one of the dynamic 'sub-hills' in the 
Malaysian economic landscape, due to its heavy focus on manufacturing 
and innovation in various high-tech industry sectors, especially in the 
electrical and electronic sector (Arafﬁn 2011). However, there is another 
side to this story. Zooming further in on Penang the picture becomes 
more complex. Poh Heem Heem, from the both publicly and privately 
funded Penang Skills Development Center (PSDC), agrees that economi-
cally speaking, Malaysia is ahead of most of its ASEAN competitors, 
mainly in the export of commodities and in the electronic components 
sector. However, according to Poh the rate of this progress has slowed 
down, which she attributes to Malaysia being caught in the so-called 
'middle income trap' (Poh 2010: 46). As a kind of response to the ﬁgures 
and predictions put forward in the 2011 Economist Intelligence Unit's 
report, she characterizes the Malaysian economy as exhibiting more 
problematic developments including an erosion of its competitive base, 
a decrease in private investments, and a decline in productivity and a 
serious 'brain drain' within both academia and industry (Yeah 2011).
Poh's advice to the national government (2010: 46) is that Malaysia 
must boost the value-added dimension of its exports if it is not to lose 
its status as a strong growth-oriented economy. In addition, one of the 
deﬁning features of the 'middle income trap' is a lack of industrial inno-
vation. During ﬁeldwork in Penang in March 2011, the author discussed 
this issue with several informants from within the automation industry. 
The main issues were whether there was a lack of innovative capability 
or lack of an innovative environment in Penang. The informants believe 
that there are many talented and innovative people in Penang. This was 
also stressed by researchers from the Socio-Economic and Environmental 
Research Institute (SERI), one of the main Penang think-tanks, who also 
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stressed a need for industrial innovation. They saw a lack of innovation 
as due to, in part, complacency on behalf of the current entrepreneurs 
and/or in part due to the current full employment situation, which, 
according to the informants, in itself does not encourage innovative 
thinking. This, along with the high cost of developing completely 
new products, results mainly in industries further developing already 
existing products, rather than developing new ones. According to the 
informants, this is not what industrial innovation is all about, as it does 
not help the industry or Penang for that matter, to move up the value 
chain. Only new products have the capacity to do that. It is important 
to mention here that this view of the importance of innovation is fully 
supported by the Global Competitiveness Report covering the period 
2009-2010.16
A Malaysian Federal Government Response to this State of 
Affairs
Both the Malaysian federal government and the Penang state govern-
ment are well aware of the difference in outlook between the predictions 
for growth as formulated in the Economist Intelligence Unit's May 2011 
report and the more critical insights that domestic researchers air about 
the state of the Malaysian economy and the Penang state economy in 
particular. To counter the critical voices the federal government has de-
signed what it calls a 'New Economic Model' (NEM), a plan to operation-
alize one of the 'four pillars' to facilitate a process of national economic 
change, namely the Economic Transformation Programme (ETP).17 The 
NEM consists of a series of strategic reform initiatives proposed by the 
National Economic Advisory Council to put the ETP into action.
As can be seen in Table 1, the NEM approach is liberal in its orienta-
tion towards the market in order to further open it up to foreign as well 
as domestic investors.
There is an emphasis on economic growth led by the private sector, 
a localized decision-making process and a favouring of technologically 
capable industries and ﬁrms, thus providing the background to further 
attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Gone are centralized strategic 
planning, state participation in the economy and restrictions on foreign 
skilled workers. The shadow from the developmental state that lies over 
the 'old approach' appears to have disappeared. The recommendations 
from the 'new approach' in the NEM ﬁt very well into the current devel-
opmental tendencies in the global economy, where trade liberalization 
and open markets are the dominant issues on the agenda. The main 
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tenet in the NEM is a deeper engagement in the global economy thus 
promoting a higher degree of interdependency with the global economy. 
Due to this 'open door' economic policy, it becomes harder for the Ma-
laysian state to employ a political and/or economic approach based on 
decoupling from its global engagement in case it wants to nurture more 
domestic developmental schemes and interests. 
Figure 1 shows how the NEM will go about operationalizing the stra-
tegic reform initiatives. The basic premise is that vested interests have 
created a logjam that is blocking transformation and growth and that 
the Malaysian people must be prepared for the upcoming changes.
Eight strategic reform initiatives have been developed to transform 
the economy in such a way that together they would lead toward 
higher growth. This will result in a constructive triangulation of high 
income, economic sustainability and social and political inclusiveness, 
resulting in improved quality of life. The checks and balances in this 
system are feedback mechanisms, which should lead to a review and 
an eventual revision of the whole developmental process, thus insuring 
a maximum positive impact on the Malaysian economy and ultimately 
the Malaysian society.
Introducing a Triangulation Approach to Assess the 
Viability of the NEM in a 'Glocalized' Context
As mentioned in the beginning of this article, one of the main themes 
to be developed here is a model of economic triangulation to delineate 
an increasing interdependency between global and local markets, thus 
demonstrating the problems behind the argument that it is possible to 
decouple national economic initiatives from the global economy. Before 
going into detail, however, it is important to provide a background for 
TABLE 1: New and Old Economic Approach
Old Approach New Approach 
Growth through capital accumulation Growth through productivity 
Dominant state participation in the economy 
(CME) 
Private sector-led growth (LME) 
Centralized strategic planning Localized autonomy in decision-making 
Balanced regional growth Cluster- and corridor-based economic activi-
ties 
Favour speciﬁc industries and ﬁrms Favour technologically capable industries and 
ﬁrms 
Export dependence on G-3 markets Asian and Middle-Eastern orientation 
Restrictions on foreign skilled workers Retain and attract skilled professionals 
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selecting Malaysia as a case study for this analysis, as opposed to other 
nations within Southeast Asia. Using the ﬁgures from the Global Com-
petitiveness Report 2010-2011,18 I have selected four Southeast Asian 
countries besides Malaysia to position the Malaysian economy in a 
Southeast Asian context. Singapore has been left out of the equation as it 
is economically speaking far above the other Southeast Asian countries 
and should be related to countries such as Hong Kong, South Korea and 
Taiwan. Furthermore, Laos and Burma are not included in the report 
due to a lack of data. The four selected countries are Indonesia, Thailand, 
Vietnam and Cambodia. The reason for including Cambodia is to show 
the span between the selected countries. Malaysia and the four selected 
countries are measured in terms of: competitiveness, basic requirements,19 
efﬁcient enhancers,20 and innovation and sophistication factors. 
Malaysia leads in all four categories. However, Thailand and Indo-
nesia are not that far behind, and Vietnam, at least in terms of competi-
tiveness, is on its way to catching up with the other Southeast Asian 
countries, thus becoming a serious player in the near future. Nonetheless, 
FIGURE 1: The New Economic Model: Enablers and Strategic Reform 
Initiatives 
Source: Penang Economic Monthly, June 2010: 49.
Enabling Actions         Strategic Reform Initiatives    Outcomes
Coherent 'big push' to boost transformation and growth
High 
Income
Inclusiveness Sustainability
Quality of Life
Break logjam 
of vested 
interests 
through 
political will 
and leader-
ship
Prepare 
Rakyat 
for 
change
1. Re-energizing the private 
sector
2. Developing quality work-
force and reducing depend-
ency on foreign labour
3. Creating a competitive do-
mestic economy
4. Strengthening of the public 
sector
5. Transparent and market-
friendly afﬁrmative action
6. Building the knowledge base 
infrastructure
7. Enhancing the sources of 
growth
8. Ensuring sustainability of 
growth
Feedback: Review, Revise
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due to the fact that Malaysia tops the list of Southeast Asian countries 
(again disregarding Singapore), this country ﬁts nicely into the following 
analysis, as it constitutes a benchmark for measuring the other countries 
in terms of regional competitiveness.
Returning to the discussion of economic triangulation, I will in the 
following apply a triangular approach to analyze the Malaysian market 
in a global economic context. The focal points in the triangle consist of 
(1) how foreign investors 'read' the Malaysian market, (2) domestic so-
cietal factors, and ﬁnally (3) the impact of the national economic policy 
in this context.
In order to 'read' and thus prepare a company for entering a foreign 
market, in this case the Malaysian one, Dunning and Lundan (2009) sug-
gest that foreign investors could take a theoretical point of departure in 
the Elective Paradigm, also termed the OLI paradigm, and combine that 
with Barney's (1991) Resource Based View (RBV). When employing the 
three analytical levels of the OLI paradigm, namely (O) ownership spe-
ciﬁc advantages, (L) location speciﬁc advantages and (I) internalization 
speciﬁc advantages, as a theoretical approach for entering the Malay-
sian market combined with the RBV in order to update, reinforce and 
maintain a company's level of competitiveness, and combining this with 
the macro-economic ﬁgures as outlined in the Economist Intelligence 
Unit's 2011report plus key economic ﬁgures provided by the Malaysian 
national economic statistical bureau, a green light for investing in this 
market is given. In other words, positive macroeconomic ﬁgures en-
courage foreign investors to invest despite the fact that some domestic 
researchers from PSDC and SERI point toward the problematic state of 
affairs in terms of a ﬂagging level of FDI, a small increase in domestic 
productivity and a decrease in international competitiveness. However, 
as we have seen, the federal and state governments are already address-
ing these critical challenges through the NEM strategy aided in a speciﬁc 
TABLE 2: Ranking of Selected Southeast Asian Nations According to 
the Global Competitiveness Report 2010-11
 Competitiveness
2009-2010     2010-2011
Basic  
requirements
Efﬁcient 
enhancers
Innovation & so-
phistication factors
Malaysia 24 26a 33 24 25
Indonesia 54 44 60 51 37
Thailand 36 38 48 39 49
Vietnam 75 59 74 57 53
Cambodia 110 109 113 103 106
Source: Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011.
Notes: a Switzerland ranks number one.
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Penang context by economic facilitators such as Penang Development 
Center, investPenang and PSDC.
Turning towards the second point of the triangle, which deals with 
societal factors, foreign investors might combine the OLI and RBV with 
an institutional theoretical approach as developed by North (1991), 
Scott (2008) and Peng (2002). Here the emphasis is not on key economic 
ﬁgures but rather on Malaysian society's institutions as well as how the 
two main categories of societal institutions, formal institutions (consist-
ing of more or less well deﬁned and enforced rules and regulations in 
relation to the juridical system, industrial and political development 
schemes, educational as well as social welfare systems, etc.) and informal 
institutions (religion, culturally deﬁned value systems, collectivist and 
family-oriented social systems, etc.), relate and impact each other.
Having deﬁned the Malaysian market as belonging to the emerging 
market category, Peng (2002) states that in general, informal institutions 
have a rather great impact on the functionality, implementation and 
applicability of the formal institutions thus making the overall society 
more or less unstable. If one was to employ institutional theory on the 
Malaysian market, the perspective, as seen by an international investor, 
would not be as bright as when looking at it through the key economic 
ﬁgures. The problems excavated through this theoretical lens consist of 
a rather severe brain and capital drain,21 problematic relations among 
the Malay, Chinese and Indian ethnic groups, increasing socio-political 
internalization of a radicalizing Islam, tight control of public opinion 
through the employment of the Internal Security Act (ISA) and tensions 
between the federal and (especially opposition-run) state governments,22 
just to mention some of the ﬁndings such an analysis would reveal.
By combining the key ﬁndings from the OLI/RBV and institutional 
analysis, foreign investors get quite a deep insight into how the Malay-
sian market and society function respectively as well as how the two 
societal sectors relate to each other. As a consequence of these analyses 
foreign investors might adopt a 'wait and see' approach to investment 
in the Malaysian market due to the insecurities delineated in the societal 
sectors even though the key economic ﬁgures shows a positive tendency. 
After all, seen from foreign investors' perspective, their main point if 
they are to invest in the Malaysian market is to be reasonably sure of a 
positive return on their investment.
Arguably, a triangulation of the global and the national economy com-
bined with an analysis of the societal context in which both the global and 
national economy are embedded constitutes a powerful tool to analyze 
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the constitution of, in this case, a 'hilly' and dynamic socio-economic land-
scape. Due to the ﬁndings from the institutional analysis of the Malaysian 
society, an observer is prompted to ask, who are the main beneﬁciaries of 
the NEM economic policy: international investors or the national/local 
entrepreneurs? If one takes another look at Table 1, where the NEM ap-
proach to national economic development is outlined, the 'new' economic 
approach compared to the 'old' one relates to an almost neo-liberal policy. 
Gone is the 'nursing state', and in comes  (global) open market forces that, 
besides introducing a 'minimal state', also have a fragmenting effect on the 
Malaysian/Penang market, thus increasing the competitive level there. 
Knowing, for example, that the Penang state government focuses very 
much on attracting FDI to ﬁnance its development schemes, this leaves 
out, for example, those SMEs that are not capable of attracting FDI or 
contribute to it by becoming either sub-contractors or suppliers to MNCs.23 
The development of socio-economic fault-lines within the local SME com-
munity is thus a likely outcome of such a developmental scheme, thus 
creating the elements for a non-coherent domestic market that constitutes 
an easy target for predatory international business interests. From this 
perspective, the NEM and the various economic initiatives it represents do 
not lift the Malaysian economy out of the 'middle income trap' in which 
it currently ﬁnds itself, nor does it help domestic businesses move up the 
value chain. From the look of it, the NEM seems to be designed as a tool 
to attract more FDI, as this constitutes the principal source for (re-)fuel-
ling further domestic economic developments. Basically, if Malaysia is to 
avoid losing its current status as a fast developing 'hill' in an otherwise 
dynamic 'hilly' Southeast Asian economic landscape, then it has to start 
addressing the social and political problems in the informal sector as 
highlighted in the institutional analysis. Potential global investors might 
not like what they ﬁnd there!
Conclusion
This article has highlighted the explanatory power of a triangular ap-
proach in identifying the global economic impact on a national economic 
development scheme that is designed to ease socio-political tensions 
within the Malaysian society thus luring foreign investors to Malaysia. 
This holistic theoretical approach stands in sharp contrast to a decou-
pling approach that maintains that an analysis of just one of the three 
points in a given triangle is academically feasible thus disconnecting 
the relationship to the other points in the process. The strength of the 
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triangular approach lies exactly in its ability to pinpoint the interdepend-
encies among all three points in the model thus stressing the dynamic 
and holistic aspect among them.
This insight would be rather difﬁcult to detect if an observer had 
taken a decoupling approach. From the perspective of an advocate of 
decoupling, government policy initiatives in relation to governing inter-
ethnic relations and their ramiﬁcations on the stability of the industrial 
setup would be perceived as belonging to the domestic sphere, thereby 
detaching it from a global context. As a consequence, the more subtle 
global inroads into the national economic setup in the form of domestic 
structural economic reforms would most likely have gone unnoticed 
due to the focus on domestic politicking.
As stated in the beginning of this article, it seems problematic in an 
age of globalization to talk about national political and economic de-
coupling from the global community. As discussed in this article it is 
impossible to decouple from a world that is characterized by increasing 
integration, interdependency and harmonization, keywords that bind 
the various societal, national and supra-national levels together. Based 
on the ﬁndings presented here, we have to realize that Harvey's notion 
of a time-space compression is correct when deﬁning the current state 
of the global community, but this does not mean that the world has 
become more ﬂat. On the contrary, its 'spiky' nature has become even 
more pronounced.
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at Copenhagen Business School. His research interests include political and 
economic relations between China and Southeast Asia, ethnic Chinese business 
strategies and networking in Southeast Asia, ethnic identity, nationalism and 
economic and political globalization, human rights and Asian values and issues 
of security and processes of democracy.
NOTES
1  This paper was presented at the Fourth East Asian Net Research Workshop at Charles 
University, Prague, 6-7 October 2010. 
2   See http://www.weforum.org/. 
3  For more details, see Frank and Gills (1996). 
4  For a more detailed discussion in this connection, see Gesteland (2005) and Nisbett 
et al. (2001).
5  Conrad de Aenlle, 'Decoupling: Theory vs. Reality', The New York Times, 7 February 
2008.
6  Conrad de Aenlle, 'Decoupling: Theory vs. Reality', The New York Times, 7 February 
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2008. 
7  Harmonization and integration, pushed forward by the collapse of the Berlin Wall, 
Netscape, workﬂow software, outsourcing, offshoring, uploading, supply chaining, 
insourcing and in-forming.
8  Deﬁned as wireless, voice over Internet, and ﬁle sharing.
9  Deﬁned as the convergence of the ten 'ﬂatteners', horizontalization of business 
practices, and economic liberalization of emerging markets.
10  For a more detailed discussion of the role of institutions in various types of markets, 
see North (1991).
11  For a full discussion of LMEs and CMEs, see Stephenson 2002.
12  For further readings on varieties of capitalism, see Whitley (1998) and Hall and 
Soskice (2001).
13  For a further discussion of the notion of trust, see Fukuyama (1995).
14  For a pertinent case study in this connection see 'Realities of Emerging Markets: Some 
Lessons from Unilever's Strategy for Lifebuoy & Sunsilk in India', http://www.
icmrindia.org/casestudies/catalogue/Marketing1/MKTA008.htm.
15  See http://country.eiu.com/Malaysia. 
16  See https://members.weforum.org/pdf/GCR09/GCR20092010fullreport.pdf. 
17  The other three pillars are: 1Malaysia, the Governmental Transformation Programme 
(GTP), and the 10th Malaysian Plan 2011-2015.
18  See http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2010-
11.pdf. 
19  Basic requirements: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment and 
health and primary education.
20  Efﬁcient enhancers: higher education and training, goods market efﬁciency, labour market 
efﬁciency, ﬁnancial market development, technological readiness and market size.
21  Toh Kin Woon in Penang Economic Monthly, August 2010, pp. 16-19.
22  Francis Hutchinson in Penang Economic Monthly, July 2010, pp. 8-14.
23  According to Chin Yee Whah (2011 (forthcoming)),SMEs constitute about 99 per 
cent of the industrial setup in Penang.
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